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We ﬁrst develop a two-bloc model of an emerging open economy interacting with
the rest of the world calibrated using Indian and US data. The model features a
ﬁnancial accelerator and is suitable for examining the eﬀects of ﬁnancial stress on the
real economy. Three variants of the model are highlighted with increasing degrees of
ﬁnancial frictions. The model is used to compare two monetary interest rate regimes:
domestic Inﬂation targeting with a ﬂoating exchange rate (FLEX(D)) and a man-
aged exchange rate (MEX). Both rules are characterized as a Taylor-type interest rate
rules. MEX involves a nominal exchange rate target in the rule and a constraint on its
volatility. We ﬁnd that the imposition of a low exchange rate volatility is only achieved
at a signiﬁcant welfare loss if the policymaker is restricted to a simple domestic in-
ﬂation plus exchange rate targeting rule. If on the other hand the policymaker can
implement a complex optimal rule then an almost ﬁxed exchange rate can be achieved
at a relatively small welfare cost. This ﬁnding suggests that future research should
examine alternative simple rules that mimic the fully optimal rule more closely.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E37, E58
Keywords: DSGE model, Indian economy, monetary interest rate rules, ﬂoating
versus managed exchange rate, ﬁnancial frictions.
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While there is a substantial body of literature devoted to understanding business cycle
dynamics in developed economies, research focusing on emerging economies is relatively
sparser. Data limitations have often been identiﬁed as a cause, but the real challenge is
to provide sensible explanations for the markedly distinct observed ﬂuctuations in these
economies. Indeed, some stylized facts may be pointed out: output growth tends to be
subject to larger swings in developing countries, private consumption, relative to income,
is substantially more volatile, terms of trade and output are strongly positively correlated,
while real interest rates and net exports are countercyclical (see Agenor et al. (2000) and
Neumeyer and Perri (2005), for example). Emerging market economies are also vulnerable
to sudden and sharp reversals of capital inﬂows, the “sudden stops” highlighted in Calvo
(1998). Understanding these diﬀerences and carefully modeling the transmission mecha-
nism of internal and external shocks is crucial to the design of stabilization programs and
the conduct of economic policies.
Thus, in this paper we develop a two-bloc model of an emerging open economy inter-
acting with the rest of the world. Alongside standard features of small open economies
(SOE) such as a combination of producer and local currency pricing for exporters and oil
imports, our model incorporates ﬁnancial frictions in the form of a ﬁnancial accelerator,
where capital ﬁnancing is partly or totally in foreign currency, as in Gertler et al. (2003)
and Gilchrist (2003)). This intensiﬁes the exposure of a SOE to internal and external
shocks in a manner consistent with the stylized facts listed above. In addition, we allow
for liability dollarization and liquidity-constrained households, which further amplify the
eﬀects of ﬁnancial stress. We then focus on monetary policy analysis, calibrating the
model using data for India and the US economy. The Indian economy is small in relation
to the world economy and we therefore treat it as a small open economy.
Many emerging economies conduct their monetary and ﬁscal policy according to the
‘three pillars macroeconomic policy framework’: a combination of a freely ﬂoating ex-
change rate, an explicit target for inﬂation over the medium run, and a mechanism that
ensures a stable government debt-GDP ratio around a speciﬁed long run, but may allow
for counter-cyclical adjustments of the ﬁscal deﬁcit over the business cycle. By contrast,
the currency monetary policy stance of the Indian Reserve Bank intervenes in the foreign
exchange market to prevent what it regards as excessive volatility of the exchange rate.
On the ﬁscal side, Central Government has a rigid ﬁscal deﬁcit target of 3% of GDP
irrespective of whether the economy is in boom or recession (Shah (2008)). Thus, our
framework allow us to contrast these implied policy prescriptions for interest rate rules.
1There is now a growing literature that compares alternative monetary policy regimes
in their ability to stabilize emerging economies when faced with shocks and ﬁnancial
frictions. Some papers close to ours include Gertler et al. (2003), Cespedes et al. (2004),
Cook (2004), Devereux et al. (2006) and Curdia (2008). All these papers conﬁrm the
result in this paper that ﬂexible exchange rate regimes outperform a peg. Only Curdia
(2008) compares these regimes with the optimal policy, but only in deterministic exercise
in which optimal policy is designed following a sudden stop. By contrast our rules are
optimal or, the case of simple rules optimized within the category or rule in anticipation of
a range of future stochastic shocks. An important feature of our work is the introduction
of a zero lower bound into the construction of policy rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sections
3 sets out the form of monetary and ﬁscal rules under investigation. Section 4 describes
three variants of the model and examines the workings of the ﬁnancial accelerator. Section
5 presents the main results of the paper and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Our modelling strategy is to start from a fairly standard two-bloc ‘New Open Economy’
micro-founded DSGE model and then proceed to introduce various features appropriate
to an emerging economy such as India. The beneﬁts of this step-by-step approach are two-
fold: ﬁrst, it builds upon a large emerging literature and second, it enables the researcher
to assess both the policy implications and the empirical relevance of each modelling stage.
First the standard model: the two blocs are asymmetric and unequally-sized, each
one with diﬀerent household preferences and technologies. The single (relatively) small
open economy then emerges as the limit when the relative size of the larger bloc tends to
inﬁnity. Households are Ricardian, and work, save and consume tradable goods produced
both at home and abroad. In a Wicksellian framework with a nominal interest rate target
as the monetary instrument, we assume a ‘cashless economy’ and thus ignore seigniorage
from money creation. There are three types of ﬁrms: wholesale, retail and capital pro-
ducers. Wholesale ﬁrms borrow from households to buy capital used in production and
capital producers build new capital in response to the demand of wholesalers. Monopolis-
tic retailers adopt staggered price-setting with both producer and local currency pricing
for exports in the home bloc, but only producer currency pricing in the large foreign bloc.
Households supply a diﬀerentiated factor input which provides a further source of market
power. In principle we could introduce staggered wage setting, but in accordance with
labour market conditions in India we assume that wages are ﬂexible. Oil imports enter
2into consumption and production in both blocs.
With these foundations we now proceed to some important features of emerging mar-
kets and here our focus is on ﬁnancial frictions. In many developing countries including
India, ﬁrms face signiﬁcant capital market imperfections when they seek external funds to
ﬁnance new investment. Along the lines of Bernanke et al. (1999), Gertler et al. (2003),
Gilchrist (2003) (see also Cespedes et al. (2004) and Curdia (2008)), we introduce a ‘ﬁ-
nancial accelerator’ in the form of an external ﬁnance premium for wholesale ﬁrms that
increases with leverage. We assume that part of the the debt of wholesale ﬁrms is ﬁnanced
in foreign currency (dollars), because it is impossible for ﬁrms to borrow 100 percent in
domestic currency owing to ‘original sin’ type constraints – a phenomenon dubbed ‘liabil-
ity dollarization’. There are two further forms of ﬁnancial frictions: ﬁrst households face
a risk premium when borrowing in world ﬁnancial markets which introduces a ‘national
ﬁnancial accelerator’ as in Benigno (2001). Liability dollarization and the national ﬁnan-
cial accelerator departures add additional dimensions to openness.1 Finally we assume
that a signiﬁcant proportion of households are excluded altogether from credit markets,
do not save and can only consume out of current post-tax and transfer income.
Details of the model are as follows.
2.1 Ricardian Households
There are ν households in the ‘home’, emerging economy bloc and ν∗ households in the





where Et is the expectations operator indicating expectations formed at time t, β is the
household’s discount factor, Ct(h) is a Dixit-Stiglitz index of consumption deﬁned below
in (5), HC,t = hCCt−1 is ‘external habit’ in consumption and Lt(h) are hours worked.
An analogous symmetric intertemporal utility is deﬁned for the ‘foreign’ representative
household and the corresponding variables (such as consumption) are denoted by C∗
t (h),
etc.
We incorporate ﬁnancial frictions facing households as in Benigno (2001). There are
two non-contingent one-period bonds denominated in the currencies of each bloc with
payments in period t, BH,t and B∗
F,t respectively in (per capita) aggregate. The prices of
1See also Batini et al. (2007) for a SOE model with these features and, in addition, transactions
dollarization owing to the assumption that households derive utility from holdings of both domestic and
foreign currency.











where φ( ) captures the cost in the form of a risk premium for home households to hold
foreign bonds, Bt is the aggregate foreign asset position of the economy denominated in
home currency and PH,tYt is nominal GDP. We assume φ(0) = 0 and φ′ < 0. Rn,t and R∗
n,t
denote the nominal interest rate over the interval [t,t + 1]. The representative household
h must obey a budget constraint:
(1 + τC,t)PtCt(h) + PB,tBH,t(h) + P∗
B,tStB∗
F,t(h) + TLt
= Wt(h)(1 − τL,t))Lt(h) + BH,t−1(h) + StB∗
F,t−1(h)
+ (1 − τΓ,t)Γt(h) (3)
where Pt is a Dixit-Stiglitz price index deﬁned in (13) below, Wt(h) is the wage rate,
TLt are lump-sum taxes net of transfers, τC,t, τL,t and τΓ,t are sales, labour income and
proﬁts tax rates respectively and Γt(h) dividends from ownership of ﬁrms. In addition,
if we assume that households’ labour supply is diﬀerentiated with elasticity of supply η,
then (as we shall see below) the demand for each consumer’s labor supplied by ν identical











r=1 Wt(h)1−η  1










wage index and average employment respectively.
Let the number of diﬀerentiated goods produced in the home and foreign blocs be n
and n∗ respectively. We assume that the the ratio of households to ﬁrms are the same in
each bloc. It follows that n and n∗ (or ν and ν∗) are measures of size. The per capita
















where  C is the elasticity of substitution between and composite of home and foreign ﬁnal
















































where CH,t(f,h) and CF,t(f,h) denote the home consumption of household h of variety f
produced in blocs H and F respectively and ζ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties in each bloc. Analogous expressions hold for the foreign bloc which indicated
with a superscript ‘∗’ and we impose ζ = ζ∗ for reasons that become apparent in section
2.2.3.2 Weights in the non-oil consumption baskets in the two blocs are deﬁned by
wZ = 1 −
n
n + n∗(1 − ω); w∗
Z = 1 −
n∗
n + n∗(1 − ω∗) (7)
In (7), ω, ω∗ ∈ [0,1] are a parameters that captures the degree of ‘bias’ in the two blocs.
If ω = ω∗ = 1 we have autarky, while ω = ω∗ = 0 gives us the case of perfect integration.
In the limit, as the home country becomes small n → 0 and ν → 0. Hence wZ → ω and
w∗
Z → 1. Thus the foreign bloc becomes closed, but as long as there is a degree of home
bias and ω > 0, the home country continues to consume foreign-produced consumption
goods.
Denote by PH,t(f), PF,t(f) the prices in domestic currency of the good produced by ﬁrm



































2Consistently we adopt a notation where subscript H or F refers to goods H or F produced in the home
and foreign bloc respectively. The presence (for the foreign bloc) or the absence (for the home country)
of a superscript ‘∗’ indicates where the good is consumed or used as an input. Thus C
∗
H,t refers to the
consumption of the home good by households in the foreign bloc. Parameter w and w
∗ refer to the home
and foreign bloc respectively, etc.

























and the domestic consumer price index Pt given by
Pt =
 




wZ(PH,t)1− Z + (1 − wZ)(PF,t)1− Z  1
1−µZ (14)
with a similar deﬁnition for the foreign bloc.











Pt . However with local currency pricing the real exchange rate and the terms
of trade, deﬁned as the domestic currency relative price of imports to exports Tt =
PF,t
PH,t,

















































Thus if  C =  ∗
C, then RERt = RERZ,t and the law of one price applies to the aggregate
price indices iﬀ  Z =  ∗
Z and w∗
Z = 1 − wZ. The latter condition holds if ω = ω∗ = 0 and
home bias disappears. If there is home bias, the real exchange rate appreciates (RERt
falls) as the terms of trade deteriorates.
We assume ﬂexible wages. Then maximizing (1) subject to (3) and (4), treating habit



























6where UC,t and −UL,t are the marginal utility of consumption in the two currencies and
the marginal disutility of work, respectively.
(18) is the ﬁrst order condition for holdings of domestic bonds and equates the real
marginal utility from one unit of home currency in the current period with the discounted
expected real marginal utility from the payoﬀ in the next period from a domestic bond.
(19) is the analogous ﬁrst order condition for holdings of foreign bonds. In (20) the real
disposable wage is proportional to the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and leisure, −
UL,t
UC,t, and the constant of proportionality reﬂects the market power of
households that arises from their monopolistic supply of a diﬀerentiated factor input with
elasticity η.
In what follows we assume that this and other all tax rates are held ﬁxed and only
lump-sum taxes of transfers are used for stabilization. Then combining (18) and (19) we

















In the absence of an international risk premium, φ( ) → 0 and (21) reduces to the standard
UIP condition.3
2.2 Non-Ricardian Households
Suppose now there are two groups of households, a ﬁxed Ricardian proportion 1 − λ
without credit constraints and the remaining proportion of non-Ricardian, ‘rule of thumb’
(RT) households λ who consume out of post-tax income. Ricardian households own retail
ﬁrms and earn monopolistic proﬁts. They also accumulate wealth in the form of domestic
and overseas assets. Non-Ricardian households accumulate no wealth and in the absence
of collateral are excluded from credit markets.
Let C1,t(h), W1,t(h) and L1,t(h) be the per capita consumption, wage rate and labour
supply respectively for the Ricardian group. Then the optimizing households are denoted
as before with Ct(h), Wt(h) and Lt(h) replaced with C2,t(h), W2,t(h) and L2,t(h). Utility
for the two groups is still given by (1). External habit for each group is HC = hCCi,t ;i =
1,2, that is each group makes a within-group comparison only, ignoring the consumption
of the other group and indeed that of a third group, entrepreneurs, considered later when
we model the ﬁnancial accelerator.
The budget constraint of the RT consumers is given by
Pt(1 + τC,t)C1,t(h) = (1 − τL,t)W1,t(h)L1,t(r) + TL1,t (22)
3In log-linearized form this becomes log(1 + Rn,t) − log(1 + Rn,t) = Et[logSt+1] − St.
7where TL1,t is net lump-sum transfers received per credit-constrained household. Fol-
lowing Erceg et al. (2005) we further assume that RT households set their wage to be
the average of the optimizing households. Then, since RT households face the same
demand schedule as the optimizing ones, they also work the same number of hours.
Hence in a symmetric equilibrium of identical households of each type, the wage rate
is given by W1,t(r) = W1,t = W2,t(r) = W2,t = Wt and hours worked per household is
L1,t(h) = L2,t(h) = Lt. The only diﬀerence between the income of the two groups of
households is that optimizing households as owners receive the proﬁts from the mark-up
of domestic monopolistic ﬁrms.












and average consumption per household over the two groups is given by




t etc are similarly deﬁned.
2.3 Firms
There are three types of ﬁrms, wholesale, retail and capital producers. Wholesale ﬁrms
are run by a third group of households, risk-neutral entrepreneurs who purchase capital
and employ household labour to produce a wholesale goods that is sold to the retail sector.
The wholesale sector is competitive, but the retail sector is monopolistically competitive.
Retail ﬁrms diﬀerentiate wholesale goods at no resource cost and sell the diﬀerentiated
(repackaged) goods to households. The capital goods sector is competitive and converts
the ﬁnal good into capital. The details are as follows.
2.3.1 Wholesale Firms and The Financial Accelerator
Wholesale goods are homogeneous and produced by entrepreneurs who combine diﬀeren-


















8where we recall that Lt(h) is the labour input of type h, At is an exogenous shock cap-
turing shifts to trend total factor productivity in this sector.4 Minimizing wage costs
 ν







Wholesale goods sell at a price PW
H,t in the home country. Equating the marginal product















Let Qt be the real market price of capital in units of total household consumption.
Then noting that proﬁts per period are PW
H,tYt −WtLt −PO,tOILt = α1PW
H,tYt, using (28),
the expected return on capital, acquired at the beginning of period t, net of depreciation,











t (as with Rt) is the return on capital over the period [t,t + 1] and δ is the
depreciation rate of capital. This expected return must be equated with the expected cost
of funds over [t,t+1], taking into account credit market frictions.5 Wholesale ﬁrms borrow
from home and foreign ﬁnancial intermediaries in both currencies, with exogenously given


















= (1 + Θt)
 








4Following Gilchrist et al. (2002) and Gilchrist (2003), we ignore the managerial input into the produc-
tion process and later, consistent with this, we ignore the contribution of the managerial wage in her net
worth.
5We assume all ﬁnancial returns are taxed at the same rate and therefore do not aﬀect arbitrage
conditions.
6We do not attempt to endogenize the decision of ﬁrms to partially borrow foreign currency; this lies
outside the scope of this paper.
9If ϕ = 1 or if UIP holds this becomes (1+Θt)Et [1 + Rt]. In (32), RERt ≡
P ∗
t St
Pt is the real






−1 is the ex post real interest rate over [t−1,t]






; Θ′( ) > 0, Θ(0) = 0, Θ(∞) = ∞ (33)
where Bt = QtKt − Nt is bond-ﬁnanced acquisition of capital in period t and Nt is the
beginning-of-period t entrepreneurial net worth, the equity of the ﬁrm.7 Note that the ex
post return at the beginning of period t, Rk







Kt−1 + (1 − δ)Qt
Qt−1
(34)
and this can deviate from the ex ante return on capital.
Assuming that entrepreneurs exit with a given probability 1−ξe, net worth accumulates
according to
Nt = ξeVt + (1 − ξe)Dt (35)
where Dt are transfers from exiting to newly entering entrepreneurs continuing, and Vt,





− (1 + Θt−1)
 








A reasonable assumption is that Dt = νVt. Note that in (36), (1 + Rk
t−1) is the ex post
return on capital acquired at the beginning of period t − 1, (1 + Rt−1) is the ex post
real cost of borrowing in home currency and (1 + R∗
t−1) RERt
RERt−1 is the ex post real cost of
borrowing in foreign currency. Also note that net worth Nt at the beginning of period t
is a non-predetermined variable since the ex post return depends on the current market
value Qt, itself a non-predetermined variable.
Along a deterministic balanced growth path (BGP) with balanced trade and therefore
no net overseas assets we have that ¯ Nt = (1 + g) ¯ Nt−1 and 1 + Rk = (1 + Θ)(1 + R) =
1 + Θ)(1 + R∗). Therefore
¯ Nt = (1 + g) ¯ Nt−1 = (ξe + (1 − ξe)ν)¯ Vt = (ξe + (1 − ξe)ν)(1 + Θ)(1 + R) ¯ Nt−1 (37)
7The entrepreneur borrows from a ﬁnancial intermediary that in turn obtains funds from households at
a real ex post cost Rt−1 = (1+Rn,t−1)
Pt
Pt−1. Entrepreneurs can borrow up to KtQt. The return to capital
is subject to idiosyncratic shocks for which the lender pays a monitoring cost to observe. Bernanke et al.
(1999) show that the optimal ﬁnancial contract between a risk-neutral intermediary and entrepreneur takes
the form of a risk premium given by (33). Thus the risk premium is an increasing function of leverage of
the ﬁrm. Following these authors, in the general equilibrium we ignore monitoring costs.
10Thus from (36), given values for ξe, Θ and R, for a BGP the remaining parameter ν must
be set such that (ξe + (1 − ξe)ν)(1 + Θ)(1 + R) = 1 + g.
Exiting entrepreneurs consume Ce
t, the remaining resources, given by
Ce
t = (1 − ξe)(Vt − Dt) = (1 − ξe)(1 −  )Vt =
(1 − ξe)(1 − ν)
ξe + (1 − ξe)ν
Nt (38)


























Retail ﬁrms are monopolistically competitive, buying wholesale goods and diﬀerentiating
the product at a ﬁxed resource cost F. In a free-entry equilibrium proﬁts are driven to
zero. Retail output for ﬁrm f is then Yt(f) = Y W
t (f)−F where Y W
t is produced according
to production technology (25). We provide a general set-up in which a ﬁxed proportion
θ of retailers set prices in the Home currency (producer currency pricers, PCP) and a
proportion 1 − θ set prices in the dollars (local currency pricers, LCP).8 Details are as
follows:
2.3.3 PCP Exporters
Assume that there is a probability of 1 − ξH at each period that the price of each good
f is set optimally to ˆ PH,t(f). If the price is not re-optimized, then it is held constant.9








ˆ PH,t(f) − PH,t+kMCt+k
 
where Dt,t+k is the discount factor over the interval [t,t + k], subject to a common10
downward sloping demand from domestic consumers and foreign importers of elasticity ζ
8As with the foreign currency borrowing parameter ϕ, we make no attempt to endogenize the choice of
PCP and LCP.
9Thus we can interpret
1
1−ξH as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged.
10Recall that we have imposed a symmetry condition ζ = ζ
∗ at this point; i.e., the elasticity of substi-
tution between diﬀerentiated goods produced in any one bloc is the same for consumers in both blocs.
11as in (8) and MCt =
P W
H,t













and by the law of large numbers the evolution of the price index is given by
P
1−ζ
H,t+1 = ξH (PH,t)
1−ζ + (1 − ξH)( ˆ PH,t+1(f))1−ζ (42)
For later use in the evaluation of tax receipts, we require monopolistic proﬁts as a















For good f imported by the home country from PCP foreign ﬁrms the price P
p
F,t(f),









Price setting in export markets by domestic LCP exporters follows is a very similar fashion
to domestic pricing. The optimal price in units of domestic currency is ˆ P∗ℓ
H,tSt, costs are



















+ (1 − ξH)( ˆ P∗ℓ
H,t+1(f))1−ζ (45)
Foreign exporters from the large ROW bloc are PCPers so we have
PF,t = StP∗
F,t (46)
Table 1 summarizes the notation used.










F = StP ∗
F non-existent
Table 1. Notation for Prices
122.3.5 Capital Producers
Capital adjustment costs are borne by capital producers, a convenient modelling device
in the context of the FA. As in Smets and Wouters (2003) we introduce a delayed re-
sponse of investment observed in the data. Capital producers combine existing capital,
Kt, leased from the entrepreneurs to transform an input It, gross investment, into new
capital according to
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + (1 − S (It/It−1))It ; S′, S′′ ≥ 0; S(1) = S′(1) = 0 (47)
This captures the ideas that adjustment costs are associated with changes rather than


















where weights in investment are deﬁned as in the consumption baskets, namely
wI = 1 − (1 − n)(1 − ωI); w∗
I = 1 − n(1 − ω∗
I) (49)
with investment price given by
PI,t =
 
wI(PH,t)1−ρI + (1 − wI)(PF,t)1−ρI  1
1−ρI (50)
Capital producers choose the optimal combination of domestic and foreign inputs accord-










































. This change is
motivated by the successful attempts at ﬁtting DSGE models such as Smets and Wouters (2003) with our
form of adjustment costs to data. However our results are not very sensitive to diﬀerent formulations of
these costs. In a balanced growth steady state adjustment costs are associated with change relative to
trend so that the conditions on S( ) along the balanced growth path become S(1 + g) = S
′(1 + g) = 0.
12This ignores leasing costs which Gertler et al. (2003) show to be of second order importance.
132.4 The Government Budget Constraint and Foreign Asset Accumula-
tion
The government issues bonds denominated in home currency. The government budget
identity is given by
PB,tBG,t = BG,t−1 + PH,tGt − Tt (53)
Taxes are levied on labour income, monopolistic proﬁts, consumption and capital re-
turns at rates τL,t, τΓ, τC,t, τK,t respectively. Then adding lump-sum taxes13 levied on all
consumers, TL2,t, and subtracting net lump-sum transfers to the constrained consumers,
TL1,t, per capita total taxation net of transfers is given
Tt = τL,tWtLt + τΓ,tΓt + τC,tPtCt − λTL1,t + (1 − λ)TL2,t + τK,tRk
t−1PtQtKt (54)
In what follows, we take lump-sum taxes and transfers to be the dynamic ﬁscal instruments
keeping tax rates constant at their steady-state values. For later use we then write Tt in
(54) as a sum of the instrument TI
t = −λTL1,t + (1 − λ)TL2,t and remaining taxes which
change endogenously, TNI
t .
Turning to foreign asset accumulation, let
 ν
h=1 BF,t(h) = νBF,t be the net holdings
by the household sector of foreign bonds. An convenient assumption is to assume that
home households hold no foreign bonds so that BF,t = 0, and the net asset position of
the home economy Bt = −B∗
H,t; i.e., minus the foreign holding of domestic government
bonds.14 Summing over the household budget constraints (including entrepreneurs and
capital producers), and subtracting (53), we arrive at the accumulation of net foreign
assets:
PB,tBt = Bt−1 + WtLt + Γt + (1 − ξe)PtVt + PtQt(1 − S(Xt))It
− PtCt − PtCe
t − PI,tIt − PH,tGt − PO,tOILt
≡ Bt−1 + TBt (55)
where the trade balance, TBt, is given by the national accounting identity
PH,tYt − PO,tOILt = PtCt + PtCe
t + PI,tIt + PH,tGt + TBt (56)
Terms on the left-hand-side of (56) are oil revenues and the value of net output; on the
right-hand-side are public and private consumption plus investment plus the trade surplus.
13If tax rates are held ﬁxed, then the ‘lump-sum tax’ can be considered to be minus the income tax rate
times the threshold at which labour income tax starts to operate. An decrease in the threshold is then
equivalent to an increase in a lump-sum tax.
14An alternative assumption with the same eﬀect is to assume that and the government issues bonds
denominated in foreign currency (see Medina and Soto (2007)).
14So far we have aggregated consumption across constrained and unconstrained con-
sumers. To obtain separately per capita consumption within these groups, ﬁrst consolidate
the budget constraints (53) and (3), to give














Then using (22) and (55), we arrive at
C2,t = C1,t +
1
1−λ [−TBt + Tt − PH,tGt + (1 − τΓ,t)Γt − λTL1,t] − TL2,t
(1 + τC,t)Pt
(57)
In a balanced growth steady state with negative net foreign assets and government debt,
the national and government budget constraints require a primary trade surplus (TB > 0)
and a primary government surplus (T > PHG). Since private sector assets are exclusively
owned by unconstrained consumers this may result in a higher consumption per head
by that group. The same applies to proﬁts from retail ﬁrms since they are assumed to
also be exclusively owned by unconstrained consumers. On the other hand lump-sum
transfers to constrained consumers plus lump-sum taxes on unconstrained consumers,
−λTL1,t + (1 − λ)TL2,t tend to lower the consumption gap.
2.5 The Equilibrium
In equilibrium, ﬁnal goods markets, money markets and the bond market all clear. Equat-
ing the supply and demand of the home consumer good and assuming that government
expenditure, taken as exogenous, goes exclusively on home goods we obtain for the ﬁnal
goods market15
Yt = CH,t + Ce










This completes the model. Given nominal interest rates Rn,t,R∗
n,t the money supply
is ﬁxed by the central banks to accommodate money demand. By Walras’ Law we can
dispense with the bond market equilibrium conditions. Then the equilibrium is deﬁned
at t = 0 as stochastic sequences C1,t, C2,t, Ct, Ce
t , CH,t, CF,t, PH,t, PF,t, Pt, PO,t, Mt,
BH,t = BG,t, BF,t, Wt, Yt, Lt, P0
H,t, PI
t , Kt, It, Qt, Vt, foreign counterparts C∗
1,t, etc, RERt,
and St, given the monetary instruments Rn,t, R∗
n,t, the ﬁscal instruments and exogenous
processes.
15Note that all aggregates, Yt, CH,t, etc are expressed in per capita (household) terms.
152.6 Specialization of The Household’s Utility Function
The choice of utility function must be chosen to be consistent with the balanced growth
path (henceforth BGP) set out in previous sections. As pointed out in Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (2004), chapter 9, this requires a careful choice of the form of the utility as a
function of consumption and labour eﬀort. As in Gertler et al. (2003), it is achieved by a
utility function which is non-separable. A utility function of the form
U ≡
 
Φ(h)1−̺(1 − Lt(h))̺ 1−σ
1 − σ
(59)
where Φt = Ct(h) − hCCt−1 and where labour supply, Lt(h), is measured as a proportion
of a day, normalized at unity, satisﬁes this requirement.16
2.7 State Space Representation
We linearize around a deterministic zero inﬂation, zero net private sector debt, balanced



















































where zt is a vector of predetermined exogenous variables, xt are non-predetermined vari-
ables, and ot is a vector of outputs. The monetary instruments are the two nominal interest
rates rn,t and r∗
n,t in the home and foreign blocs respectively. The ﬁscal instruments are
real lump-sum taxes on Ricardian households tl2,t−pH,t and tl∗
2,t−p∗
F,t and real lump-sum
transfers to non-Ricardian households tl1,t −pH,t and tl∗
1,t −p∗
F,t.17 Matrices A, B, etc are
functions of model parameters. Rational expectations are formed assuming an information
set {z1,s,z2,s,xs}, s ≤ t, the model and the monetary rule. Details of the linearization are
provided in Appendix B.
16A BGP requires that the real wage, real money balances and consumption grow at the same rate at
the steady state with labour supply constant. It is straightforward to show that (59) has these properties.
17We deﬁne all lower case variables as proportional deviations from this baseline steady state except for






where X is the baseline steady state. For variables expressing a rate of change over time such as the
nominal interest rate rn,t and inﬂation rates, xt = Xt − X.
16We subject the model to nine exogenous and independent shocks that form the vector
vt+1: total factor productivity (at), government spending (gt) in both blocs; the external
risk premium facing ﬁrms, ǫP,t in the home country; a copper price shock; an oil shock;
a risk premium shock to the modiﬁed UIP condition, ǫUIP,t; and a shock to the foreign
interest rate rule ǫ∗
R,t. The foreign bloc is fully articulated, so the eﬀect of these shocks
impacts on the domestic economy through changes in the demand for exports, though
since the domestic economy is small, there is no corresponding eﬀect of domestic shocks
on the ROW.
2.8 The Small Open Economy
Following Felices and Tuesta (2006), we can now model a SOE by letting its relative size in
the world economy n → 0 whilst retaining its linkages with the rest of the world (ROW).
In particular the demand for exports is modelled in a consistent way that retains its
dependence on shocks to the home and ROW economies. We now need a fully articulated
model of the ROW. From (7) we have that wZ → ω and w∗
Z → 1 as n → 0. Similarly for
investment we have wI → ωI and w∗
I → 1 as n → 0. It seems at ﬁrst glance then that the
ROW becomes closed and therefore exports from our SOE must be zero. However this
is not the case. Consider the linearized form of the output demand equations in the two
blocs:




Z,t + αI,Hit + α∗
I,Hi∗
t + αGgt
+ [ Z(αC,H + αe





















Z) +  αC,FwZ + ρ∗
Iα∗
I,F(1 − w∗
I) + ρIαI,FwI]τt (62)





























































(1 − n)Y ∗ → 0
αe
C,F =
(1 − wZ)(1 − ξe)nkky
ξe
nY
















(1 − n)Y ∗ → 0
Thus we see that from the viewpoint of the ROW our SOE becomes invisible, but not
vice versa. Exports to and imports from the ROW are now modelled explicitly in a way
that captures all the interactions between shocks in the ROW and the transmission to the
SOE.
2.9 Calibration
For simplicity, and as a preliminary simulation exercise, we calibrate the parameters of
the model. The calibration is partly based on the ﬁtting of the steady state of the model
to macroeconomic data. In other places we draw upon the micro-econometrics literature.
This is explained next.
2.9.1 Calibration of Home Bias Parameters
The bias parameters we need to calibrate are: ω, ω∗, ωI and ω∗
I. Let in the steady state
Ce = seC be consumption by entrepreneurs, and cy = C
Y . Let csimports be the GDP share
of imported consumption of the foreign (F) consumption good. Let csexports be the GDP




























18Similarly for investment deﬁne isimports to be the GDP share of imported investment of
the F investment and isexports be the GDP share of exports of H investment good. Then
with iy = I




















in the steady state. We linearize around a zero trade balance TB = 0, so we require
csimports + isimports = csexports + isexports (63)
in which case αC,H + αe
C,H + α∗
C,H + αI,H + α∗
I,H = cy + iy as required. Thus we can use
trade data for consumption and investment goods, consumption shares and relative per
capita GDP to calibrate the bias parameters ω, ω∗, ωI and ω∗
I. We need the home country
biases elsewhere in the model, but for the ROW we simply put ω∗ = ω∗
I = 1 everywhere
else, so these biases are not required as such.
2.9.2 Calibration of Household Preference Parameter
We now show how observed data on the household wage bill as a proportion of total













since Φ = CΦC = (1 − hC)C. In (64),
W(1−τL)L
P(1+τC)C is the household post-tax wage bill as a
proportion of total consumption, which is observable.
2.9.3 Calibration of Remaining Parameters
We begin with estimates of the processes describing the exogenous shocks.
Shock parameters
The shock processes for India in the following table are based upon ﬁtting AR(1)
models to detrendend macroeconomic India data for TFP and government spending. As
for (21), we impose the modiﬁed UIP condition using the rupee-dollar real exchange rate,
the India-US interest real bank rate diﬀerential and India’s net foreign asset position as
a proportion of nominal GDP (in steady-state deviation form), thus estimating δr and
ﬁtting an AR(1) to the corresponding residual term. US processes are taken from the
posterior estimates for the ROW ﬁtted to US data.
19India Parameter Value Source ROW Parameter Value Source
ρa 0.85 cal ρ∗
a 0.95 SW07
sda 0.03 cal sd∗
a 0.45 SW07
ρg 0.85 cal ρ∗
g 0.97 SW07
sdg 0.05 cal sd∗
g 0.52 SW07
n.a. n.a. n.a. ρ∗
r 0.12 SW07
n.a. n.a. n.a. sd∗
r 0.24 SW07
ρUIP 0.2 cal n.a. n.a. n.a.
sdUIP 0.04 cal n.a. n.a. n.a.
ρP 0.85 cal ρ∗
P 0.92 GLY
sdP 0.5 cal sd∗
P 1.41 GLY
n.a. n.a. n.a. ρ∗
oil 0.97 MS
n.a. n.a. n.a. sd∗
oil 12.0 MS
Table C1. Parameterization of Shock Processes
Deep parameters values are provided for India in part by NIPFP partners (these are
underlined). Otherwise standard or parameters used for Chile are used.
Preferences
Risk Aversion Parameters: Estimates in the literature suggests range σ ∈ [2,5]. However,
for the US Bayesian estimates suggest a range σ∗ ∈ [2,3]. Our estimates are σ = 2.5,3.14,
σ∗ = 2.
Discount Factors: A standard choice is β = β∗ = 0.99
Working Day: A standard value is L∗ = 0.40 for the US. We choose a higher value
L = 9/16 = 0.56 for India.
Oil Consumption Shares: 1 − wC = 1 − w∗
C = 0.02 (MS)
Habit Parameters: hC = 0.6 , h∗
C = 0.70 (SW07)
Substitution Elasticites: A standard choice for open economies is  Z =  ∗
Z = 1.5.
 C =  ∗
C = 0.3 (MS)
Technology
Depreciation Rates: A standard choice is δ∗ = 0.025, δ = 1 − (1 − 0.25)0.25 = 0.069, con-
verting to an quarterly basis.
Common World Growth Rate: We choose a common world growth rates: g = g∗ = 4%
per annum
Investment Adjustment Costs: S′′(1 + g) = 2.0 (MS), (S′′(1 + g))∗ = 4.0 from SW07
20Production Shares: α2 = 0.77 , α1 = 0.20, α3 = 1 − α1 − α2 − α3 = 0.01 α∗
2 = 0.69,
α∗
1 = 0.29, α∗
3 = 0.01 = 1 − α∗
1 − α∗
2 − α∗
3 = 0.01 (SW07)
Investment Substitution Elasticities: ρI = ρ∗
I = 0.5 (MS)
Financial Accelerators
Elasticity: χθ = −0.065, χ∗
θ = −0.05 (BGG)
Home currency borrowing for capital: ϕ ∈ [0,1]
Survival rate: ξe = ξ∗
e = 0.97 (GGN)
Asset/Debt Ratio:
QK
B = 1.7 = 1
1−nk; hence nk = 0.412. n∗
k = 0.7 (BGG)
FA Risk Premium: Θ = Θ∗ = 0.035/4 on a quarterly basis (BGG)
UIP Risk Premium: δr = 0.01
Market Power
Labour Market Power: Elasticity of labour demand with respect to the relative wage is
η = 3 (SW), corresponding to a 50% mark-up, η∗ = 6, corresponding to a 20% mark-up.
Product Market Power: ζ = 7.67 corresponding to a 15% (SW, LOWW).
Pricing
Calvo Contract: a standard value ξH = ξ∗
F = 0.75, corresponding to 4 quarter price con-
tracts on average (see MS)
Consumption, Investment and Trade Shares
Standard values for the US are c∗
y = 0.6, i∗
y = 0.2 and gy = 0.2 For India we choose
cy = 0.58, iy = 0.32, gy = 0.10, tb = 0.0 which is consistent with the choice of zero net
asset-GDP ratio below.
Trade Shares: Ignoring trade in energy and raw materials we require 0.25 = csimports +
isimports = csexports + isexports for balanced trade. NIPFS provide: csimports = 0.15,
isimports = 0.05, csexports = 0.10 and isexports = 0.03. To make this consistent with bal-
anced trade put csimports = 0.08
Fiscal Deﬁcit and Overseas Assets
FS












21NIPFP provide a ﬁgure of 27.5% living below the poverty line. Compare this with λ = 0.6
for Chile (MS) and λ∗ = 0.4 for the US (KL). We must conclude that non-Ricardian
households extend beyond the poor. Use Chile for now.
Tax Rates and Transfers
Since the tax rates impact at the margin on ﬂuctuations in tax, we use marginal rates:
τL = 0.2, τC = 0.125, τK = τΓ = 0.30. Guess at TL1
PHY =0.05, TL2
PHY = 0.05 in both blocs.
Standard values for ROW are: τ∗
L = τC = 0.2; τ∗
K = τΓ = 0.05
3 Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules
In this section we specify the monetary and ﬁscal rules. Monetary instruments are nominal
interest rates rn,t and r∗
n,t in the home and foreign blocs respectively. The ﬁscal instruments
are real lump-sum taxes on Ricardian households tl2,t−pH,t and tl∗
2,t−p∗
F,t and real lump-




In line with the literature on open-economy interest rate rules (see, for example, Benigno
and Benigno (2004)), we assume that the central bank in the emerging market bloc has
three options : (i) set the nominal interest to keep the exchange rate ﬁxed (ﬁxed exchange
rates, ‘FIX’); (ii) set the interest rate to track deviations of domestic or CPI inﬂation from
a predetermined target (inﬂation targeting under fully ﬂexible exchange rates, ‘FLEX(D)’
or ‘FLEX(C)’); or, ﬁnally (iii) follow a hybrid regime, in which the nominal interest rates
responds to both inﬂation deviations from target and exchange rate deviations from a cer-
tain level (managed ﬂoat, ‘MEX’). Many emerging market countries follow one or another
of these options and most are likely to in the near future.18 Formally, the rules are:
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime, ‘FIX’. This is implemented by
rn,t = ρrn,t−1 + θsst (65)
where θs is chosen to be very large. In fact we implement ‘FIX’ as a ‘MEX’ regime below,
with feedback coeﬃcients chosen to minimize a loss function that includes a large penalty
18Mallick (2009) estimates a structural VAR with the exchange rate and provides evidence of exchange
rate targeting by the RBI.
22on exchange rate variability. (Note that values for the loss function reported below remove
the latter contribution).
Inﬂation Targets under a Fully Flexible Exchange Rate, ‘FLEX(D)’ or ‘FLEX(C)’.
This takes the form of Taylor rule with domestic or CPI inﬂation and output targets:
rn,t = ρrn,t−1 + θππH,t + θyyt (66)
rn,t = ρrn,t−1 + θππt + θyyt (67)
where ρ ∈ [0,1] is an interest rate smoothing parameter.
Managed Exchange Rate, ‘MEX’. In this rule the exchange rate response is direct
rather than indirect as in the CPI inﬂation rule, (67):19
rn,t = ρrn,t−1 + θππH,t + θyyt + θsst (68)
subject to a nominal exchange rate volatility constraint
 ∞
t=0 βtvar(st) ≤ V S where V S
is an upper bound on the average discounted future variance of the exchange rate at time
t = 0. Alternatively we can impose a constraint that var(st) ≤ V S in the stochastic steady
state.
In all cases we assume that the central bank and the ﬁscal authorities in the emerging
market bloc enjoy full credibility. Although this assumption may have been considered
heroic a few years ago, today there are several emerging market countries that have suc-
ceeded in stabilizing inﬂation at low levels and have won the trust of, including economies
with a history of high or hyper-inﬂation (e.g. Brazil, Israel, Peru and Mexico, among
others. See Batini et al. (2006). Accounting for imperfect credibility of the central bank
remains nonetheless important for many other emerging market countries, and can lead to
higher stabilization costs than under full credibility (under inﬂation targeting and ﬂoat-
ing exchange rate, see Aoki and Kimura (2007) or even sudden stops and ﬁnancial crises
(under ﬁxed exchange rates, see IMF (2005)).
3.2 Fiscal Rules
Since the focus of this paper is on monetary policy we chose very rudimentary ﬁscal rules
with no stabilization role. The ﬁscal rule for lump-sum taxes on Ricardian households tl2,t
19Rule (67) describes one of many possible speciﬁcations of a managed ﬂoat, namely one where the
central bank resists deviations of the exchange rate from a certain level–considered to be the equilibrium–
as well as deviations of inﬂation from target and output from potential. An equally plausible speciﬁcation
involves a feedback on the rate of change of the exchange rate, in which case the central bank aim is to
stabilize exchange rate volatility, i.e. the pace at which the domestic currency appreciates or depreciates
over time. For a discussion see Batini et al. (2003). To limit the number of simulations and results to be
compared, here we limit ourselves to one speciﬁcation only.
23is simply that real tax receipts as a proportion of GDP stabilizes government debt as as a
proportion of GDP. Lump-sum transfers to non-Ricardian households tl2,t are held ﬁxed




PHY , the ﬁscal rule in linearized form is
tl2,t = pH,t−1 + αbgbG,t−1 (69)
tl1,t = pH,t (70)
3.3 Policy in the Foreign Bloc
The foreign bloc is closed from its own viewpoint so we can formulate its optimal policy
without any strategic considerations. Since our focus is on the home country we choose
a standard model without a FA in the foreign bloc and very simple monetary and ﬁscal




















Maximizing the quadratic discounted loss function in the four parameters ρ∗ ∈ [0,1],
θ∗
π ∈ [1,10],20 α∗
y, α∗
bg ∈ [0,∞] and imposing a ZLB constraint in a way described in detail
below for the home country, we obtain for the calibration in that bloc: ρ∗ = 1, θ∗
π = 10,
θ∗
y = 0 and α∗
bg = 0.87. The optimized monetary rule then is of a diﬀerence or ‘integral’
form that aggressively responds to any deviation of inﬂation from its zero baseline but
does not react to deviations of output.21
With the foreign bloc now completely speciﬁed we turn to policy in the home country.
In the following section we conﬁne ourselves to a simple ad hoc monetary and ﬁscal rules
without any attempt to optimize welfare
4 The Financial Accelerator and Model Variants
We parameterize the model according to three alternatives, ordered by increasing degrees
of frictions:
• Model I: no ﬁnancial accelerator and no liability dollarization. (χθ = χ∗
θ = 0,
Θ = Θ∗ = 0, ǫp = ǫ∗
p = 0, ϕ = 1). This is a fairly standard small open-economy
20We restrict our search to π
∗
θ ∈ [1,10]: the lower bound ensures the rule satisﬁes the ‘Taylor Principle’
for all ρ and the imposed upper bound avoids large initial jumps in the nominal interest rate.
21The latter feature is a common one in the DSGE literature - see, for example, Schmitt-Grohe and
M.Uribe (2005).
24model similar to many in the New Keynesian open-economy literature with the only
non-standard features being a non-separable utility function in money balances, con-
sumption, and leisure consistent with a balanced growth path and a fully articulated
ROW bloc;
• Model II: ﬁnancial accelerator (FA) only; (χθ,χ∗
θ < 0, Θ,Θ∗ > 0, ǫp,ǫ∗
p  = 0,
ϕ = 1).
• Model III: ﬁnancial accelerator (FA) and liability dollarization (LD), assuming that
ﬁrms borrow a fraction of their ﬁnancing requirements 1−ϕ ∈ [0,1] in dollars.(χθ,χ∗
θ <
0, Θ,Θ∗ > 0, ǫp,ǫ∗
p  = 0, ϕ ∈ [0,1))
4.1 The Workings of the Financial Accelerator
To understand how the transmission of policy and shocks for diﬀerent levels of frictions
and dollarization, we need ﬁrst to take a step back and illustrate some of the mechanisms
driving the real exchange rate, and the behavior of net worth of the wholesale ﬁrms sector.
Movements in the real exchange rate (and the related terms of trade) are critical for
understanding our results. Linearization of the modiﬁed UIP condition (21) gives
rert = Etrert+1 + Et(r∗
t − rt) − δrbF,t + ǫUIP,t (74)
Solving (74) forward in time we see that the real exchange rate is a sum of future expected
real interest rate diﬀerentials with the ROW plus a term proportional to the sum of future
expected net liabilities plus a sum of expected future shocks ǫUIP,t. The real exchange
will depreciate (a rise in rert) if the sum of expected future interest rate diﬀerentials are
positive and/or the sum of expected future net liabilities are positive and/or a positive
shock to the risk premium, ǫUIP,t occurs.
Also crucial to the understanding of the eﬀects of the FA and LD is the behaviour of














(1 + R)θt−1 + (1 + Θ)(ϕrt−1 + (1 − ϕ)(r∗
t−1 + (1 + R)(rert − rert−1)
  
(75)
where the ex post real interest rates in period t − 1 are in linearized form deﬁned as
rt−1 = rn,t−1 − (1 + R)πt (76)
rt−1
∗ = r∗
n,t−1 − (1 + R)π∗
t (77)
25and where the ex ante cost of capital is given by rk
t−1. In (75) since leverage 1
nk > 1 we can
see that net worth increases with the ex post return on capital at the beginning of period t,
rk
t−1, and decreases with the risk premium θt−1 charged in period t−1 and the the ex post
cost of capital in home currency and dollars, ϕrt−1+(1−ϕ)(r∗
t−1+(1+R)(rert−rert−1)),
noting that (rert − rert−1) is the real depreciation of the home currency.















Thus net worth falls if Tobin’s Q falls and if some borrowing is in dollars (ϕ < 1), we see
that a depreciation of the real exchange rate (rer1 > 0) brings about a further drop in net
worth. However an appreciation of the real exchange rate (rer1 < 0) will oﬀset the drop
in net worth. Finally net worth also falls the domestic and foreign inﬂation rates fall and
thereby increase the ex post real interest rates and therefore the ex post cost of capital.
If net worth falls, output also falls through two channels: ﬁrst, a drop in Tobin’s Q and
a subsequent fall in investment demand and second, through a reduction in consumption
demand by entrepreneurs.
Finally we conﬁrm that for a ﬁxed exchange rate regime with rn,t = r∗
n,t (i.e., no
ﬁnancial friction in the international bond market) liability dollarization has no impact
on net worth. For this regime rert = p∗
t − pt and therefore ∆rert = π∗
t − πt. Then it is














[(1 + R)θt−1 + (1 + Θ)rt−1]
 
(79)
which corresponds to the accumulation of net worth in the absence of LD.
4.2 A Credit Crunch: Impulse Responses to a Risk Premium Shock
Further insights into monetary and ﬁscal policy transmission mechanisms with a ﬁnancial
accelerator can be obtained from impulses following an unanticipated 1% risk premium
shock with AR1 process ǫP,t+1 = 0.95ǫP,t.22 We conﬁne ourselves to very simple ad hoc
22This is a very similar exercise to the study of a “sudden stop” as in Curdia (2008). In his paper he
provides a deeper formulation of the origin of the shock as arising from shifts in the perceptions of the
foreign lender.
26rules of the form
rn,t = ρrn,t−1 + (1 − ρ)(θππH,t + θyyt) (80)
tl2,t = pH,t + αbgbG,t−1 (81)
tl1,t = pH,t (82)
Thus the real transfers to non-Ricardian households are held ﬁxed and the implementation
lag problem is ignored. Figure 1 shows various impulse response functions for the three
model variants. For model III with LD we choose a modest degree of foreign currency
borrowing with ϕ = 0.9. Fiscal policy only impacts on government debt and is otherwise
independent of the parameter αbg. For the monetary Taylor rule we choose the following
parameters estimated for Chile by Medina and Soto (2007): ρ = 0.74, θπ = 1.67, θy = 0.39
which are in the standard range for estimated rules.
Following the 1% risk premium shock (ǫP,0 = 1) there is an immediate output rise
which is driven by the immediate increase in demand following the fall in the terms of
trade. This occurs because the commitment rule promises a drawn out period where
the nominal interest rate is below the foreign rate and so the nominal exchange rate
depreciates. The increase in the cost of capital drives Tobin’s Q down and investment
falls. However installation costs ensure this negative demand eﬀect is gradual; after a few
quarters it begins to dominate the terms of trade eﬀect on demand and output starts to
fall. Net worth falls as a result of the increase in the cost of capital and the FA accentuates
both these eﬀects. The FA plus the LD accentuates these further and in turn ‘accelerates’
the fall in output and investment.
5 Optimal Monetary Policy
With both ﬁscal policy and the foreign bloc now completely speciﬁed we can now turn to
the design of monetary policy in the home country. Results for the model variant I are
presented with those for models II and III to follow. First we must formulate a linear-
quadratic approximation of the optimization problem facing the monetary authority. This
is particularly convenient as we can then summarize outcomes in terms of unconditional
(asymptotic) variances of macroeconomic variables and the local stability and determinacy
of particular rules. The framework also proves useful for addressing the issue of the zero
lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
275.1 Quadratic Approximation of the Loss Function
Following Woodford (2003), a ‘small distortions’ quadratic approximation to the house-
hold’s single period utility is appropriate accurate as long as the zero-inﬂation steady state
is close to the social optimum. There are three distortions that result in the steady state
output being below the social optimum: namely, output and labour market distortions
from monopolistic competition and distortionary taxes required to pay for government-
provided services. Given our calibration these features would make our distortions far
from small. However there is a further distortion, external habit in consumption, that in
itself raises the equilibrium steady state output above the social optimum. If the habit
parameter hC is large enough the two sets of eﬀects can partly cancel out and thus justify
our small distortions approximation. If this is not the case the small distortions case is only
justiﬁed if there is a subsidy in place that to retail ﬁrms that brings the market-determined
level of output in line with the social optimum.23
Results obtained below are for a single-period quadratic approximation Lt = y′
tQyt
obtained numerically following the procedure set out in From Appendix D. Insight into
the result can be gleaned from the special case where there are no oil inputs into pro-
duction or consumption and copper is not a production input either. Then the quadratic























+ wk(kt−1 − lt)2 − wayytat + wciτcitτt + wclsτclstτt + wππ2
H,t (84)
cit ≡  ω(1 − ω)cyct +  (1 − ω∗)cyc∗













and the weights wc, wτ, etc are deﬁned in Appendix D. Thus from (84) welfare is reduced
as a result of volatility in consumption adjusted to external habit, ct − hCct−1; the terms
of trade, τt, labour supply lt, domestic inﬂation πH,t and foreign shocks. There are also
some covariances that arise from the procedure for the quadratic approximation of the
loss function. The policymaker’s problem at time t = 0 is then to minimize (83) subject
to the model in linear state-space form given by (60), initial conditions on predetermined
23See Levine et al. (2007) and Levine et al. (2008a) for a discussion of these issues. The former paper
provides details of all the optimization procedures in this paper.
28variables z0 and the Taylor rule followed by the ROW. Our focus is on stabilization policy
in the face of stochastic shocks, so we set z0 = 0. The monetary instruments is the
nominal interest rate and the ﬁscal instrument consists of lump-sum taxes net of transfers.
By conﬁning ﬁscal policy to lump-sum taxes on Ricardian households only we eliminate
its stabilization contribution; this we refer to as ‘monetary policy alone’. Details of the
optimization procedure are provided in Levine et al. (2007).
5.2 The Nominal Interest Rate Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) and Exchange
Rate Upper Bound Constraints
We now modify our interest-rate rules to approximately impose an interest rate ZLB so
that this event hardly ever occurs. Our quadratic approximation to the single-period loss




t]′ and Q is a symmetric matrix.
As in Woodford (2003), chapter 6, the ZLB constraint is implemented by modifying the
single period welfare loss to Lt + wrr2
n,t. Then following Levine et al. (2008b), the pol-
icymaker’s optimization problem is to choose wr and the unconditional distribution for
rn,t (characterized by the steady state variance) shifted to the right about a new non-zero
steady state inﬂation rate and a higher nominal interest rate, such that the probability,
p, of the interest rate hitting the lower bound is very low. This is implemented by cali-
brating the weight wr for each of our policy rules so that z0(p)σr < Rn where z0(p) is the
critical value of a standard normally distributed variable Z such that prob (Z ≤ z0) = p,
Rn = 1
β(1+guc) − 1 + π∗ is the steady state nominal interest rate, σ2
r = var(rn) is the
unconditional variance and π∗ is the new steady state inﬂation rate. Given σr the steady
state positive inﬂation rate that will ensure rn,t ≥ 0 with probability 1 − p is given by24







In our linear-quadratic framework we can write the intertemporal expected welfare loss
at time t = 0 as the sum of stochastic and deterministic components, Ω0 = ˜ Ω0 + ¯ Ω0.
Note that ¯ Ω0 incorporates in principle the new steady state values of all the variables;
however the NK Phillips curve being almost vertical, the main extra term comes from the
24If the ineﬃciency of the steady-state output is negligible, then π
∗ ≥ 0 is a credible new steady state
inﬂation rate. Note that in our LQ framework, the zero interest rate bound is very occasionally hit.
Then interest rate is allowed to become negative, possibly using a scheme proposed by Gesell (1934) and
Keynes (1936). Our approach to the ZLB constraint (following Woodford, 2003) in eﬀect replaces it with
a nominal interest rate variability constraint which ensures the ZLB is hardly ever hit. By contrast the
work of a number of authors including Adam and Billi (2007), Coenen and Wieland (2003), Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003) and Eggertsson (2006) study optimal monetary policy with commitment in the face
of a non-linear constraint it ≥ 0 which allows for frequent episodes of liquidity traps in the form of it = 0.
29π2 term in (D.11). By increasing wr we can lower σr thereby decreasing π∗ and reducing
the deterministic component, but at the expense of increasing the stochastic component
of the welfare loss. By exploiting this trade-oﬀ, we then arrive at the optimal policy that,
in the vicinity of the steady state, imposes the ZLB constraint, rt ≥ 0 with probability
1 − p.
The imposition of the upper bound exchange rate volatility constraint is more straight-
forward. Now the quadratic single period welfare loss is modiﬁed to Lt + wrr2
n,t + wss2
t.
For each value of ws optimal policy is evaluated with the imposition of the ZLB as above.
Then we increase the weight ws from ws = 0 for the ﬂoating exchange rate case to a suf-
ﬁcient level that satisﬁes the upper bound on the exchange rate variance. As for the ZLB
the equilibrium welfare is then assessed by evaluating the loss after resetting wr = ws = 0.
5.3 The Optimized FLEX(D) Rule and Optimal Policy
First consider the welfare-optimal form of the domestic inﬂation-targeting rule FLEX(D)
with a ﬂoating exchange rate ws = 0. Table 2 and Figure 1 impose the ZLB constraint as
described in the previous section. We choose p = 0.001. For each value of wr we compute
the values of the feedback parameters ρ ∈ [0,1], θπ ∈ [1,10] and θy ≥ 0 that minimizes
the conditional (stochastic) welfare loss in the vicinity of the steady state. Given wr,
denote the expected inter-temporal loss (stochastic plus deterministic components) at
time t = 0 by Ω0(wr). This includes a term penalizing the variance of the interest rate
which does not contribute to utility loss as such, but rather represents the interest rate
lower bound constraint. Actual utility, found by subtracting the interest rate term, is
given by Ω0(0) = Ω0 in the table. The steady-state inﬂation rate, π∗, that will ensure the
lower bound is reached only with probability p = 0.001 is computed using (85). Given
π∗, we can then evaluate the deterministic component of the welfare loss, ¯ Ω0. Since in
the new steady state the real interest rate is unchanged, the steady state involving real
variables are also unchanged, so from (84) we can write ¯ Ω0(0) = 1
2wππ∗2.
The optimized form of FLEX(D) under the constraint that the ZLB is violated with
a probability p = 0.001 per period (in our quarterly model, once every 250 years) occurs
when we put wr = 9.75 and the steady state quarterly inﬂation rises to π∗ = 0.98% or
around 4% per year. The form of the rule is interesting: it is an integral rule where the
quarterly change in the nominal interest rate responds aggressively to domestic inﬂation,
not at all to output deviations about the steady state and slightly to exchange rate de-
viations. The absence of a feedback from output is a familiar result – inﬂation-targeting
provides suﬃcient stabilization since output and inﬂation move together. Some response
to exchange rate changes are welfare-enhancing since they impact on real consumption.
30However, although the imposition of the ZLB lowers exchange rate volatility, at the opti-
mum the standard deviation of the exchange rate deviation about the steady state is still
over 5%.
wr ws ρ θπ θy θs σ2
∆s σ2
s σ2
r ˜ Ω π∗ ¯ Ω0 Ω0
0 0 0.00 7.13 0.08 0.05 7.67 59.7 1.96 4.18 1.76 5.93 10.11
1.0 0 0.00 7.92 0.05 0.08 7.58 38.4 1.90 4.20 1.70 5.50 9.70
3.0 0 0.25 10.0 0.00 0.13 7.41 29.7 1.67 4.42 1.43 3.93 8.35
5.0 0 0.50 10.0 0.00 0.14 7.33 28.1 1.53 4.70 1.28 3.07 7.77
7.0 0 0.79 10.0 0.00 0.14 7.27 27.2 1.39 5.10 1.10 2.31 7.41
9.0 0 1.00 10.0 0.00 0.15 7.21 26.4 1.31 5.44 098 1.85 7.2871
9.75 0 1.00 10.0 0.00 0.17 7.20 26.2 1.30 5.45 0.98 1.84 7.2870
10.0 0 1.00 10.0 0.00 0.18 7.18 25.9 1.30 5.46 0.98 1.84 7.2873
Table 2. Floating Exchange Rate FLEX(D) Rule with a ZLB Constraint.
Notation: π∗ = max[z0(p)σr − ( 1
β(1+guc) − 1) × 100,0] = max[3.00σr − 2.44,0] with p =
0.001 probability of hitting the ZLB and β = 0.99, guc = −0.014. ¯ Ω = 1
2wππ∗2 = 3.829π∗2.
Ω = ˜ Ω + ¯ Ω = stochastic plus deterministic components of the welfare loss.
Table 3 and Figure 2 repeats the same exercise for the optimal policy. This can
only be implemented using a rather complex form of rule – hence the emphasis in the
literature on implementable simple rules – but the optimal form of policy is useful as a
benchmark to ascertain the welfare costs of particular simple rules.25 Now as wr increases
the steady state variance of the interest rate falls more sharply. At the optimum with
a ZLB constraint, wr = 1.25, π∗ = 0, but the exchange rate volatility is higher with a





∆s ˜ Ω0 π∗ ¯ Ω0 Ω0
0.0 0 1.54 35.9 7.25 2.58 1.28 3.13 5.71
0.5 0 0.96 35.0 7.43 2.59 0.49 0.47 3.06
0.75 0 0.83 35.5 7.53 2.61 0.28 0.15 2.76
1.0 0 0.73 36.6 7.62 2.63 0.12 0.03 2.66
1.25 0 0.65 37.9 7.69 2.65 0 0 2.65
1.5 0 0.59 39.7 7.76 2.67 0 0 2.67
Table 3. Optimal Floating Exchange Rate Policy with a ZLB Constraint.
25See Currie and Levine (1993), Woodford (2003).













FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE TAYLOR RULE: MODEL I


















Figure 1: Imposition of ZLB: Floating Exchange Rate FLEX(D) Rule













OPTIMAL FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE POLICY: MODEL I




















Figure 2: Imposition of ZLB: Optimal Floating Exchange Rate Policy
5.4 The Optimized MEX Rule and Optimal Managed Exchange Rate
Policy
Now we turn to the MEX regime. For each value of ws the previous ZLB exercise is
repeated in Table 4. Here for comparison the ﬁrst row sets out the ws = 0 case from the
wr = 1.25 row of Table 3 . It is of interest in the ﬁnal column to compare the welfare
outcome with that under optimal policy. From Appendix D in consumption equivalent






(1 − ̺)(1 − hC)cy
× 10−2 (%) (86)
For the ﬂoating exchange rate case ws = 0 we see that the welfare cost of simplicity for
the FLEX(D) rule is a not insigniﬁcant with ce = 0.29%. As the lower nominal exchange
rate volatility is imposed by raising ws its standard deviation is lowered to just over
3% (σ2
s = 9.27) at ws = 2.0 obtained by a rule that feeds back from the exchange rate
deviation strongly with θs = 2.37 with low interest rate persistence ρ = 0.15. This comes
at a welfare cost compared with the optimal rule of ce = 0.4%. To achieve a still lower
standard deviation of 2.67% (σ2
s = 7.11) requires a rule with no persistence and a feedback
θs = 3.13; i.e, a 1% depreciation must be met with a 3% increase in the quarterly interest
rate. This pattern continues until ultimately a regime very close to a ﬁxed exchange rate
is achieved with a highly aggressive rule, but at an enormous welfare cost compared with
the optimal rule of ce = 30.4%.
Can low exchange rate volatility be achieved at a much lower cost by relaxing the
constraint implied by the form of simplicity of FLEX(D)? The ﬁnal table 5 shows that this
is indeed the case and indeed a near-ﬁxed exchange rate can be reached with ce = 0.59%.
wr ws ρ θπ θy θs σ2
∆s σ2
s σ2
r ˜ Ω π∗ ¯ Ω0 Ω0 ce
9.75 0 1.00 10.0 0.00 0.17 7.20 26.2 1.30 5.45 0.98 1.84 7.29 0.29
7.75 1.0 0.69 10.0 0.13 1.54 5.36 12.7 1.21 8.43 0.87 1.45 9.88 0.46
0.15 2.0 0.00 10.0 0.26 2.37 4.55 9.27 1.29 10.94 0.97 1.82 12.76 0.64
0.0 3.0 0.00 10.0 0.30 3.13 3.90 7.11 1.20 14.21 0.85 1.38 15.59 0.82
0.0 4.0 0.00 10.0 0.33 3.80 3.41 5.76 1.14 17.26 0.76 1.10 18.36 1.00
0.0 5.0 0.00 10.0 0.35 4.42 3.03 4.86 1.10 20.00 0.69 0.92 20.92 1.16
0.0 1000 0.60 0.00 0.00 10.0 0.01 0.01 1.26 105.7 0.92 1.63 107.3 30.8
Table 4. Managed Exchange Rate Taylor Rule with a ZLB Constraint.
Notation: ce = welfare loss in as a permanent percentage change in consumption relative




∆s ˜ Ω0 π∗ ¯ Ω0 Ω0 ce
1.25 0 0.65 37.9 7.69 2.65 0 0 2.65 0
2.75 1.0 0.69 4.09 1.65 4.95 0.04 0.004 4.91 0.14
5.75 2.0 0.68 1.89 0.98 6.16 0.02 0.001 6.16 0.22
9.75 3.0 0.66 1.26 0.81 6.84 0 0 6.84 0.27
30.0 10.0 0.73 0.50 0.41 8.26 0 0 8.26 0.36
0 1000 1.43 0.0001 0.0000 9.13 1.14 2.51 11.6 0.59
Table 5. Optimal Managed Exchange Rate Policy with a ZLB Constraint.
6 Conclusions and Future Research
This preliminary paper has set out a DSGE model of an emerging open economy ﬁtted to
Indian data. We have found that the imposition of a low exchange rate volatility is only
achieved at a signiﬁcant welfare loss if the policymaker is restricted to a simple domestic
inﬂation plus exchange rate targeting rule. If on the other hand the policymaker can
implement an optimal complex rule then an almost ﬁxed exchange rate can be achieved at
a relatively small welfare cost. This ﬁnding suggests that future research should examine
alternative simple rules that mimic the fully optimal rule more closely.
We have only examined the FLEX(D) and MEX rules for the model I without a ﬁnan-
cial accelerator (FA). FLEX(C) remains to be studied as do models II (with a FA) and III
(FA plus LD). Previous research in Batini et al. (2007) using a DSGE model of the Peru-
vian economy found that the welfare-optimizing form of these rules were welfare-ranked
as follows: FLEX(D) ≻ FLEX(C) ≻ FIX where FIX is our extreme form of MEX with a
ﬁxed exchange rate. Increasing degrees of ﬁnancial frictions as one moves from model I to
III created bigger welfare-diﬀerences between the three regimes and so strengthened the
case for a ﬂoating exchange rate with domestic inﬂation targeting. Future research on the
policy side will examine whether these results carry over to the model in this paper. We
will also study welfare-optimized simple commitment rules that include optimized ﬁscal
rules as in Batini et al. (2009).
Finally future modelling developments will include the introduction of a large informal
sector into our DSGE model and an attempt to estimate the model by Bayesian-Maximum-
Likelihood methods using the calibration here as priors. In doing so we will confront the
data limitations associated especially with the informal and partly hidden economy by
adopting a consistent partial information assumption for the econometrician and private
sector alike, as in Justiniano et al. (2008).
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37A The Steady State
The zero-inﬂation, BGP steady state with net worth, consumption, wholesale output, the
wage and capital stock are growing at a rate g per period, a balanced growth path must
satisfy












= 1 + g (A.2)
¯ At+1
¯ At
= 1 + (1 − α1)g (A.3)
Since there are no investment adjustment costs at the steady state it follows that
¯ Kt+1 = (1 − δ) ¯ Kt + ¯ It (A.4)
It follows from (A.1) that
¯ It = (g + δ) ¯ Kt (A.5)
and hence the previous assumptions regarding S( ) become S(g + δ) = g + δ and
S′(g + δ) = 1.
In what follows we denote the (possibly trended) steady state of Xt by X. Then given






















































1 = β(1 + Rn)(1 + guc) = β(1 + R)(1 + guc) (A.13)
38where guc is the growth rate of the marginal utility of consumption in the steady state,
guc = (1 + g)(1−̺)(1−σ)−1 − 1 (A.14)













Y W = AKα1Lα2OILα3 (A.17)
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H + G (A.29)
Ce
H,t = (1 − ξe)V = (1 − ξe)(1 + Rk)N ≡ seCH,t (A.30)
TB = PHY − POOIL − PC − PCe − PII − PHG (A.31)
39Γ
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C2 = C1 +
1
1−λ [−TB + PS + (1 − τΓ)Γ − λTL1] − TL2
(1 + τC)P
(A.36)
plus the foreign counterparts.














Units of output are chosen so that PO = PC = PH = PF = 1. Hence T = P = PI = 1.
Hence with our assumptions regarding S( ) we have that Q = 1. We also normalize S = 1
in the steady state so that P∗
F = P∗
H = P∗ = P∗
I = 1 as well. Then the steady state of the
risk-sharing condition (A.39) becomes C = kC∗ where k is a constant.
B Linearization
Exogenous processes:
















t) + voil,t+1 (B.5)
εUIP,t+1 = ρUIPεUIP,t + vUIP,t+1 (B.6)






































(1 + R)θt−1 + (1 + Θ)(ϕrt−1 + (1 − ϕ)(r∗


























where rt−1 = rn,t−1 − (1 + R)πt and r∗
t−1 = r∗
n,t−1 − (1 + R)π∗
t are the ex post real interest rates.






























rg,t−1 + tbt (B.16)



















∆(pt − pZ,t) = (1 − wC)(πO,t − πZ,t) (B.22)
41Non-predetermined variables:




t+1) = (1 + Rk∗)q∗



































Etit+1 + it−1 +
1
(1 + g)2S′′(1 + g)

























t + δrbF,t + εUIP,t (B.32)
Instruments
rn,t = exogenous instrument (B.33)
tl1,t − pH,t = exogenous instrument (B.34)
tl2,t − pH,t = exogenous instrument (B.35)
Outputs:
mct = ul,t − uc,t + lt −
1
φF














(1 − ̺)(1 − σ) − 1
1 − hC








































c1,t = γ1(wt + lt − pt) + γ2(tl1,t − pt)









































Z,t + αI,Hit + α∗
I,Hi∗
t + αGgt
+ [ Z(αC,H + αe




































cZ,t = ct −  C(pZ − pt) (B.48)
c∗
Z,t = c∗






t −  C(pZ − pt) (B.50)
ce∗
Z,t = ce∗




(Note SOE results: w = ω, wI = ωI, w∗ = w∗
I = 1)
ce






c,t − uc,t (B.54)









t ) = (1 + R)θt + (1 + Θ)(ϕEt(rt)
+ (1 − ϕ)[Et(r∗
t) + (1 + R)(Et(rert+1) − rert))] (B.57)
Et(rk∗
t ) = (1 + R)θ∗
t + (1 + Θ∗)Et(r∗
t) (B.58)
rk
t−1 = (1 − δ)qt − (1 + Rk)qt−1 + (Rk + δ)xt−1 (B.59)
rk∗
t−1 = (1 − δ∗)q∗
t − (1 + Rk∗)q∗
t−1 + (Rk∗ + δ∗)x∗
t−1 (B.60)





pZ,t − pH,t = (1 − wZ)τt → (1 − ω)τt as n → 0 (B.63)
( Note p∗
Z,t − p∗
F,t = (1 − w∗
Z)τ∗ → 0)
pI,t − pZ,t = (wZ − wI)τt → (ω − ωI)τt (B.64)
( Note p∗
I,t − p∗
Z,t = (1 − w∗
I)τt → 0)




Z,t + (1 − w∗
C)π∗
O,t (B.66)














H,t = −∆rert + π∗
t − πt + πH,t (B.70)


























EtπZ,t+1 = wZEtπH,t+1 + (1 − wZ)EtπF,t+1 (B.75)
Etπt+1 = wCEtπZ,t+1 + (1 − wC)EtπO,t+1 (B.76)




















rg,t = (1 + Rg)
 


















tt = sL(wt − pH,t + lt − yt) + sC(pt − pH,t + ct − yt)
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tl1,t − pH,t = −
TL2k(1 − λ)
TL1 (1 − k)λ

















t = tt + λ
TL1
PHY
(tl1,t − pH,t − yt) − (1 − λ)
TL2
PHY





(tl1,t − pH,t − yt) + (1 − λ)
TL2
PHY
(tl2,t − pH,t − yt)
(B.89)











tbt = yt − αC,Hct − αe
C,Hce
t − iyit − gygt
− (cy + iy)(pt − pH,t) − iy(pI,t − pt)

















(−rerZ,t − (1 − ω)τt − τ∗
t ) (B.97)
φH,t = rerZ,t + τ∗
t + (1 − ω)τt (B.98)
rerZ,t = rert + (1 − wC)ot − (1 − w∗
C)o∗
t (B.99)
πO,t = ∆rert + π∗









pt − pH,t = pt − pZ,t + pZ,t − pH,t (B.102)
EtπO,t+1 = Etrert+1 − rert + Etπ∗
O,t+1 + Etπt+1 − Etπ∗
t+1
= Etrert+1 − rert + (ρoil − 1)p∗
























pO,t − pt = rert + pO,t
∗ − p∗
t (B.107)
cO,t = ct −  Z(pO,t − pt) (B.108)
check : ct = wCcZ,t + (1 − wC)cO,t (B.109)





kmlt = kt−1 − lt (B.111)
cciit =  ω(1 − ω)cyct +  (1 − ω∗)cyc∗









− (1 − σ)̺
L∗l∗
t














C Derived Calibrated Parameters
Given these estimates and data observations we can now calibrate the following parame-
ters:








η)W(1 − τL)(1 − L)/P(1 + τC)C
1 + (1 − 1
η)W(1 − τL)(1 − L)/P(1 + τC)C
Demand elasticities calibrated from trade data:
αC,H = (cy − csimports)(1 − se)
αe
C,H = (cy − csimports)se
α∗
C,H = csexports




























Remaining calibrated parameters are:





Rk = (1 + Θ)(1 + R) − 1
λH =

































































































Fixed Costs: From (A.27), (A.28) and (A.32)












Transfer to new entrepreneurs ν. Finally ν is derived from
(ξe + (1 − ξe)ν)(1 + Θ)(1 + R) = 1 + g
Foreign parameters follow in an analogous way.
D Quadratic Approximation of the Welfare Loss
Following Levine et al. (2008a), an accurate quadratic approximation to the utility function
can be obtained by the following procedure.
1. Set out the Lagrangian of the deterministic Ramsey Problem.
2. Calculate the ﬁrst order conditions and its steady state.
3. Keeping the multipliers at the steady state, calculate a second-order Taylor series
approximation of the Hamiltonian, about the steady state.
4. Calculate a ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation, about the steady state, of the
ﬁrst-order conditions including constraints.
5. Use 3. to eliminate the steady-state Lagrangian multipliers in 4. Then the Hamilto-
nian and the constraints can be expressed in minimal form as a quadratic form and
49linear state representation respectively. This is our accurate LQ approximation of
the original non-linear optimization problem.
To implement this procedure let ǫ be the proportion of entrepreneurial households.
Then (1−ǫ)λ and (1−ǫ)(1−λ) are the proportions of non-Ricardian worker and Ricardian
worker-households respectively. Let U(Ct,HC,1,Lt) be a general single-period utility
function in terms of consumption, habit and labour supply considered in the main text.
Then the Ramsey problem for a utilitarian benevolent welfare-maximizing policymaker to
maximize with respect to monetary and ﬁscal instruments
∞  
t=0
βt[(1 − ǫ)(λU(C1,t,H1C,t,L1,t) + (1 − λ)U(C2,t,H2C,t,L2,t)) + ǫU(Ce
t ,He
C,t,0)] (D.1)
subject to the constraints of the model.
The general solution above must be conducted numerically. However insights in the
nature of the quadratic utility function can be obtained if we adopt a ‘small distortions’
approximation which is accurate as long as the zero-inﬂation steady state is close to the
social optimum. As we have noted in the main text, the existence of external consumption
habit oﬀsets the distortions in the product and labour markets. For our calibrated high
value for the habit parameter hC, this leaves the steady state of the decentralized economy
reasonably close to the social optimum, justifying the small distortions approximation. An
analytical solution is available for the case of no oil inputs into production or consumption
and for a simple form of the social welfare function that aggregate all household types into a
single entity. Deﬁne Ca
t = (1−ǫ)(λC1,t+(1−λ)C2,t)+ǫCe
t be aggregate consumption across
the non-Ricardian worker households, non-Ricardian worker households and entrepreneurs.






































where RERI,t = StP∗








F,t ). There is a
risk-sharing condition given by
RERt = U∗
C∗
t /UCt ⇒ RERtC
(1−̺)(1−σ)−1





50where we assume initial wealth per capita is the same in each country.






kmlt = kt−1 − lt (D.7)
cciit =  ω(1 − ω)cyct +  (1 − ω∗)cyc∗









− (1 − σ)̺
L∗l∗
t








ω [ (ω2 − 1)cy + ρI(ω2
I − 1)iy − Υ
Y ]
(D.10)
Converting the welfare approximation into welfare loss, and dividing by FY leads to
2W = −(1 − hC)cy
 
(1 − ̺)[(1 − σ)(1 − ̺) − 1]cmcl2
t














[(1 − ωI)2( ω − 3ω −  ) + 1 − ω3


















(1 − ξH)(1 − βξH)
π2
t (D.11)
which corresponds to (84) in the main text.
The change in welfare for a small change in consumption-equivalent over all periods is
given by
∆Ω = (1 − ρ)
∞  
t=0
βtC(1 − hC)(1−σ)(1−ρ)−1(1 − L)ρ(1−σ)(∆C − hC∆C)
=
(1 − ρ)(1 − hC)cy
1 − β
FY ce (D.12)
Ignoring the term in FY = C(1 − hC)(1−σ)(1−ρ)−1(1−L)ρ(1−σ)Y , since all the welfare loss
terms have been normalized by this, we can rewrite this as
ce =
(1 − β)∆Ω
(1 − ρ)(1 − hC)cy
(D.13)
Furthermore, if all welfare loss terms have been further normalized by (1 − β), and that
all variances are expressed in %2, it follows that we can write ce in % terms as
ce =
∆Ω
(1 − ρ)(1 − hC)cy
× 10−2 (D.14)







































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: A Credit Crunch: Impulse Responses to a 1% External Finance
Premium AR1 Shock ǫP,t+1 = 0.95ǫP,t.
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